Abstract-This paper analyzed the reliability of the mechanical system of a new conceptual Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) using FMECA and FTA method. In the FMECA procedure, the failure modes were studied by analyzing their effects and criticalities. Then, the fault tree was built. The research was carried out in both qualitative and quantitative analysis of FTA. Using aforementioned methods, the probability of the top event, the structural and critical importance coefficients of the bottom events were performed. Finally, the failure modes of this AUV mechanical system were sequenced according to the severity and the criticality and list of the critical components was presented as well. The reliability-improving suggestions provided in the paper can be used in further reliability design and structural improvement of AUV or other similar UUV mechanism.
I. INTRODUCTION
Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) can be classified as Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROV) and Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV). AUV is defined as the UUV only with its own power supply [1] .
The new conceptual AUV presented in this paper is a model which has all typical features of AUV, but with more complex systems and more multiplex functions. The main body of the AUV consists of the hermetic hull and the inter installed equipments of its subsystems, control system and power system for instance. The unsealed prow and stern are connected to the main body with bolts, and in a similar fashion, the unsealed wings are connected with eye plates and pins. The detector which sends position signal to the detecting system inside the main body is installed in the prow. Then, the main body controls the wings and the stern to accomplish the designed missions. Moreover, the AUV could adjust the sailing status by controlling the movement of the rudders.
The mechanical system of the AUV includes the hermetic hull, the prow, the stern, the wings and the rudders. Since the performance of the mechanical system directly affects the function of AUV, and the lack of the published research of relevant reliability study and failure analysis, the study of this important issue is highly necessary.
II. FAILURE MODE, EFFECTS AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS OF THE MECHANICAL SYSTEM OF AUV
Failure mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) dates back to the 1950s. It is first applied to the analysis of the operating system of fighters [2] . This analysis method can be considered as the combination of the failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) and the criticality analysis (CA). It is a method to provide improving or preventive measures, and further to improve the reliability of products by analyzing the criticality of the effects or the consequences of the components' potential failures [3] .
A. FMEA of The Mechanical System of AUV
(1) System Definition The mechanical system of AUV consists of the following components: main body, prow, stern, wings (the left wing and the right wing), rudders (the fore rudders and the stern rudders). Table I shows the severity classification applied to the mechanical system of AUV.
(6) Failure Mode and Effect Analysis BIAN Xinqian used to study the fault events of AUV [4, 5] . By studying the references and analyzing the data of UUV failures from the experiments, the information about the effect and the severity of failures is filled into the form of FMEA as Table II. Due to the space limitation, only a few main  components of the new conceptual AUV were presented in the  FMEA table. The FMEA table just presents the information of  some main components Table III shows the criticality classification applied to the mechanical system of AUV.
(2) Criticality Analysis The first step of the quantitative analysis for FMECA is the calculation of C m , which failure rate λ p , conditional probability β and failure mode ratio α are required. The failure mode criticality C m means the probability of one failure mode under certain severity, and it is part of product criticality under specific severity [6] . The C m of the jth failure mode can be calculated as:
In the formula, λ p is the product failure rate; α j is the frequency ratio of the jth failure mode; β j is the conditional probability of the jth failure mode; t is the mission phase duration.
Product criticality C r is the probability of product failure under specific severity level, operation mode and working pattern [6] . Its value is the sum of the failure criticalities C mj under all the severity levels, C r can be calculated as:
In the formula, j is the jth product failure mode under specific severity; n is probable product failure mode number under specific severity; λ p , α j , β j , t are the same as Eq. (1).
Because of the complex failure mechanism and the cost of the reliability experiments, large amount samples experiment is impossible. Therefore, we recommend "experts grading method" from the point of engineering practicability and convenience. Considering the failure rates of the mechanical system of AUV are very low, we use the failure probability level evaluation standard in the reference [8] . This standard, as Table IV shows, is one of the most widely-used international standards. After the evaluation of every failure, finished the CA table and calculated the failure mode criticality C m and product criticality C r of every failure. Fig. 3 shows the criticality matrix with every failure criticality code in it. The matrix represents the importance of every failure according to its severity and criticality. 
C. FMECA Conclusion for The Mechanical System of AUV
At the final analysis procedure of FMECA, we filled the I, II criticality failures into the failure mode list, and the critical components of mechanical system of AUV are thus found out. The components can be sequenced in the order of their effects to the reliability of the mechanical system of AUV: the sealing elements, the hermetic hull, the prow, the wings, the fore rudders, the stern rudders, the stern stable rudders, the stern and so on.
III. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS OF THE MECHANICAL SYSTEM
OF AUV Fault tree analysis (FTA) is an important method to evaluate the reliability and safety of a complex system [2] . This method focuses on one most-unwanted event. It finds direct and indirect reasons that result in this incident from top to bottom. The analysis needs to build the logical connection and present the fault tree diagram, coupled with quantitative Criticality analysis. This method can be used by designers, operators and supervisors to analyze the system failures efficiently [3] .
A. Fault Tree Model of The Mechanical System of AUV
In order to compare with FMECA, and simplify the model as well, this paper just takes the failure rates within 100 hours into account. Therefore, the analysis does not concern about the elements of erosion, abrasion, fatigue and so on, the rates of which accumulate in time. Fig. 4 shows the fault tree model, and Table VI shows the contents of the code of the fault tree. We use X i to indicate the basic events as Table VII. 
B. Qualitative Analysis of the Mechanical System of AUV FTA qualitative analysis includes finding out all the possible fault modes that cause the top event and all the minimal cut sets. There are two methods to obtain the minimal cut sets: the top down substitution and the bottom up substitution [8] .
We use the bottom up substitution to find all the FTA minimal cut sets as follows: {X 1 }, {X 2 }, {X 3 }, …, {X 17 }, {X 8 X 10 X 12 }, {X 8 X 10 X 13 }, {X 8 X 10 X 14 }, {X 8 X 10 X 15 }, {X 8 X 10 X 16 }, {X 8 X 10 X 17 }, {X 8 X 11 X 12 }, {X 8 X 11 X 13 }, {X 8 X 11 X 14 }, {X 8 X 11 X 15 }, {X 8 X 11 X 16 }, {X 8 X 11 X 17 }, {X 9 X 10 X 12 }, {X 9 X 10 X 13 }, {X 9 X 10 X 14 }, {X 9 X 10 X 15 }, {X 9 X 10 X 16 }, {X 9 X 10 X 17 }, {X 9 X 11 X 12 }, {X 9 X 11 X 13 }, {X 9 X 11 X 14 }, {X 9 X 11 X 15 }, {X 9 X 11 X 16 }, {X 9 X 11 X 17 }.
C. Quantitative Analysis of the Mechanical System of AUV
(1) Probability of the Top Event For large complex fault tree, the minimal cut sets and the minimal path sets are huge due to the huge basic events. Therefore, it is usually difficult to calculate the accurate values of top event probability. Besides, because of the inaccurate statistical data and only 1 or 2 significant digits of bottom events probability, accurate calculation in practical engineering is often not necessary [6] . The probability of the top event can be calculated as:
In the formula, P(T) is the probability of the top event F s (t); F i (t) is the probability of the ith bottom event in the jth minimal cut set at the time of t; K j is the jth minimal cut set; N k is the number of minimal cut sets.
In this fault tree quantitative analysis, the probability of top event can be calculated by substituting the probabilities of the basic events into Eq. (3):
Therefore, the probability of the mechanical system of AUV reliability is:
(2) Structural Importance Structural importance indicates the change of the top event probability caused by the failure of the ith component [6] . The definition is:
In the formula, g i (t) is the structural importance of the ith component; g(t) is the probability of the top event; F i (t) is the failure probability of the ith component.
The probability of the top event g(t) is calculated as： 
From Eq. (4), (5), we can calculate the structural importance of the bottom events X 1~X7 as:
For the basic events from X 8 to X 9 , the structural importance is:
For the bottom events from X 10 to X 11 , the structural importance is:
For the bottom events from X 12 to X 17 , the structural importance is:
The probability importance of every component can be calculated by inserting the data into the formulas. And we can rank the failures according to the probability importance.
(3) Critical Importance Coefficient The Critical importance coefficient of the ith component is the ratio of the change rate of the failure probability of the ith component to the change rate of the top event probability [6] . The definition is:
In the formula, I i (t) is the critical importance coefficient of the ith component; g(t) is the probability of the top event; F i (t) is the failure probability of the ith component.
From Eq. (6) we know that the critical importance coefficient of the basic events X 1~X7 is: 
For the basic events from X 8 to X 9 , the critical importance coefficient is:
For the basic events from X 10 to X 11 , the critical importance coefficient is: 
For the basic events from X 12 to X 17 , the critical importance coefficient is:
By substitute the data into the formula above and ranking the I i (i=1, 2, … , 17) according to the calculation we can find the quantitative relationship of every bottom event and further analyze the main reasons of the failure of the mechanical system of AUV.
By substituting the data into the probability importance formulas and the critical importance coefficient formulas, we can get the order of the bottom events by importance coefficients:
(X 2 , X 3 , X 5 )>X 7 >(X 1 , X 4 , X 6 )>(X 12 , X 13 , X 15 , X 16 )>(X 14 , X 17 )>(X 8 , X 9 )>(X 10 , X 11 ) Therefore, we find out the main events that cause the failure of the mechanical system of AUV. They are deformation of the hermetic hull (X 2 ); the sealing elements failure (X 3 ); the prow breaks (X 5 ).
By comparison, we find out that the results of FTA and FMECA are basically consistent, which proves that the procedure and the result of the two analyses are efficient.
Based on the result of FMECA and FTA, different failures are ranked according to their effects on the AUV. The critical components list can be drawn from the results of two analyses. Table VIII lists some components that significantly affect the system. The table also presents the improving measures and design suggestions in order to reduce the failure rate, so as to improve the reliability of the AUV system. 
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper provides an example of combined FMECA and FTA for the mechanical system of a new conceptual AUV. Different failures are ranked according to their criticality and severity, and the critical components list is presented. Based on the analysis, we can find that the sealing elements are the most important components with the greatest effect to the system, and followed by hermetic hulls, the prow and so on. Finally, improving methods and design suggestions are presented in order to reduce the failure rate and improve the reliability of the mechanical system of AUV.
By comparison, we can draw a conclusion that FMECA is good at describing the effect of the component failure on the system; while FTA is good at finding all possible initial faults and calculating the reliability of the system. The combined analysis is able to reveal the relationship between component failure and system reliability more clearly and reasonably. This failure analysis method could provide a good reference for the study of UUV reliability and other system.
